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The Course of the Employment-At-Will Doctrine
In Utah: Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.A Turning of the Tide
I.

INTRODUCTION

Unless an employment contract contemplates that it is for a specified period of time, the relationship between the employer and employee is deemed to be that of "employment-at-will." 1 Under employment-at-will relationships, "an employer may discharge an employee
for ':1 good cause, a bad cause, or no cause at all." 2
During the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century, most states
judicially adopted the employment-at-will doctrine, justifying it on
grounds of freedom of contract and freedom of enterprise. 3 The rationale given to the adoption of the employment-at-will rule is not particularly surprising since at the time of its inception employment law was
"hostile to collective employee action, worker tort claims for job related
injuries, and legislative attempts to regulate employment terms." 4 Today, however, legislative exceptions to freedom of contract idealism
have been enacted to encourage collective bargaining11 and to establish
substantive prohibitions on certain types of conduct6 giving employees a
more equal bargaining position with their employers. 7 In the absence of
a collective bargaining agreement, a written or oral employment contract, or a statutory prohibition on the reason for termination of em1. Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 335 (1974).
2. /d. (footnote omitted); see also Garcia v. Aetna Finance Co., 752 F.2d 488 (lOth Cir.
1984); Continental Air Lines v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987); Note, Continental Air Lines
v. Keenan: Employee Handbooks as a Modification to Employment at Will, 60 U. CoLO. L. REV.
169, 169 (1989).
3. Note, supra note 1, at 335.
4. Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C. L. REV. 631, 637
(1988) (citing Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 118, 127-32 (1976); McCurdy, The Roots of "Liberty of Contract" Reconsidered: Major
Premises in the Law of Employment, 1867-1937, 1984 Y.B. SuP. CT. HIST. Soc'y 20, 20-33)).
5. Labor Management and Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1988).
6. /d.; Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp.); Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII
(Equal Employment Opportunities), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 1991)
7. Leonard, supra note 4, at 642.
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ployment, the common law rule of employment-at-will has endured in
theory. Recently, however, the exceptions to the employment-at-will
doctrine have been construed so broadly and applied so liberally that
the doctrine now provides little more than an analytical framework for
adjudication of claims. In reality, the rule seems to be that an employer
must have "just cause" for terminating an employee.
This note discusses the development of the employment-at-will
doctrine in Utah and the Utah Supreme Court's recent recognition of
exceptions to the doctrine that place the traditional employment-at-will
presumption in jeopardy. Part II of this note discusses the traditional
underpinnings of the employment-at-will presumption. Part III traces
the employment-at-will doctrine's development in the Utah Supreme
Court. Part IV analyzes Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd. 8 Part V examines Utah employment-at-will cases decided since Berube and offers
guidelines for employers who wish to preserve their employment-atwill status.
II.

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL
DocTRINE

A.

Adoption of Employment-At-Will in America

Like most common law theories, the employment-at-will doctrine
finds its roots in English common law. 9 In nineteenth century England,
courts almost universally held that a general hiring 10 amounted to an
employment contract one year in duration. 11 Early American cases followed the English rule/ 2 however, by the 1870s American courts had
strayed from the English rule and used varying approaches to define
employment relationships. 13
In 1877, Horace Gray Wood authored a treatise 14 that became the
cornerstone of the employment-at-will doctrine in America. 111 Wood's
treatise formulated the rule as follows:
8. 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989).
9. See Note, supra note 1, at 340.
10. In England, the term "general hiring" refers to a hiring without a specified time period.
In America, the phrase "indefinite hiring" is employed. /d. (citing Annotation, Duration of Contract of Hiring Which Specified No Term, but Fixes Compensation at a Certain Amount Per
Day, Week, Month, or Year, 11 A.L.R. 469 (1921)).
11. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1040 (Utah 1989) (citing Note, supra
note I, at 340); Leonard, supra note 4, at 640.
12. Note, supra note 1, at 340-41 (citing Adams v. Fitzpatrick, 125 N.Y. 124, 26 N.E. 143
(1891); Davis v. Gorton, 16 N.Y. 255 (1857); Bascom v. Shillito, 37 Ohio St. 431 (1882)).
13. Leonard, supra note 4, at 640 (citations omitted).
14. H. WooD, MASTER AND SERVANT, § 134 (1877).
15. Berube, 771 P.2d at 1040 (citing Note, supra note 1, at 341).
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With us the rule is inflexible that a general or indefinite hiring is
prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a
yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month, or year, no time being specified,
is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was for a
day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may
serve. 18
Wood cited four American cases as authority for his proposition/ 7
however, these cases are "apparently inapposite authority on [his proposition's] behalf." 18 Moreover, Wood offered no real analysis to support his formulation of the rule. 19
Despite the criticism that Wood's formulation has received in recent years, 20 most courts in the late 1800s and early 1900s adopted the
statement as correct. 21 Although Wood did not critically analyze his
formulation of the rule, several commentators have speculated as to
why the rule was so adopted. 22

B. justifications for Adoption of the Employment-At-Will Doctrine
1.

Principles of contract

Courts usually approach employment-at-will cases by applying
traditional contract principles such as "consideration, mutuality of obligation, and express or implied covenants." 23 Contract analysis arguably
justifies the doctrine since conceptually the employer gives as consideration a promise to pay the employee for the work performed and the
employee returns as consideration the promise to perform work for the
16. H. Woon, supra note 14, at § 134.
17. Wilder's Case, 5 Ct. Cl. 462 (1869), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v.
Wilder, 80 U.S. 254 (1872); De Briar v. Minturn, I Cal. 450 (1851); Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg.
Co., 106 Mass. 56 (1870); Franklin Mining Co. v. Harris, 24 Mich. 115 (1871), cited in Note,
supra note 1, at 341 n.53.
18. Berube, 771 P.2d at 1040 (citing Note, supra note 1, at 340-41).
19. Note, supra note 1, at 340-41.
20. See, e.g., Berube, 771 P.2d at 1040-41; Leonard, supra note 4, at 640-41; Note, supra
note I, at 341-43.
21. See, e.g., Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117,42 N.E. 416 (1895) (citing
the following cases as also adopting Wood's rule: Haney v. Caldwell, 35 Ark. 156 (1879); De
Briar v. Minturn, 1 Cal. 450 (1879); Evans v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co., 24 Mo.
App. 114 (1887); Finger v. Koch & Shilling Brewing Co., 13 Mo. App. 310 (1883); Prentiss v.
Ledyard, 28 Wis. 131 (1871); see also Clarke v. Atlantic Stevedoring Co., 163 F. 423 (E.D.N.Y.
1908); Greer v. Arlington Mills Mfg. Co., 17 Del. (1 Penne.) 581,43 A. 609 (1899); McCullough
Iron Co. v. Carpenter, 67 Md. 554, 11 A. 176 (1887)).
22. See Leonard, supra note 4, at 640-41; Comment, Protecting At Will Employees Against
Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. Rt:v. 1816, 182428 (1980); Note, supra note 1, at 342-47.
23. Leonard, supra note 4, at 636.
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employer. Accordingly, to ensure that the employee will not be discharged, except for cause, some courts have held that the employee
must give additional independant consideration. 24 Moreover, since an
employee seldom promises to quit only for just cause, arguably, mutuality of obligation allows the employer to terminate the employee at any
time for any reason.
Contracts between employers and employees, however, are not so
simple. Unlike parties to most contracts, employees and employers
closely interact for the greater part of each day. Furthermore, jobs provide the livelihood upon which most people rely. Without jobs, people
and their families would lack even the basic necessities of life. Indeed,
the loss of a job, for many, can be one of the most tramatic and devastating experiences one might face. Perhaps this reason alone explains
why so much legislation has been enacted to protect employees from
termination for certain reasons. 211
Since employment contracts involve such dissimilar circumstances
than do most other contracts, the doctrine of employment-at-will requires a basis other than contract analysis to justify its continued
existence.

2.

Freedom of contract

Probably the most justifiable basis for adherence to the employment-at-will doctrine is America's strong belief in freedom of contract.
During the late Nineteenth Century and early Twentieth Century, the
principle of freedom of contract was even more prevalent than today. In
Adair v. United States, 26 the United States Supreme Court held that
an employer's right to terminate an employee should be equated with
the employee's right to quit. 27 In doing so, the Court struck down a
federal regulation barring common carriers from firing employees for
unionizing. 28
The influence of contractual freedom in employment agreements
was fostered by the government's laissez-faire attitude toward industry.29 Policies allowing employers and employees freedom to dissolve
their contractual relationships as they wished allowed industrial capi24. See, e.g., Rose v. Allied Dev. Co., 719 P.2d 83 (Utah 1986) (citing Annotation, Validity
and Duration of Contract Purporting to Be for Permanent Employment, 60 A.L.R.3d 226, 233
(1974)).
25. See statutes cited supra note 6.
26. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
27. Jd. at 174.
28. Id. at 179-80.
29. Leonard, supra note 4, at 641.
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talism to flourish. 30 Since employers could terminate employees at any
time for any reason, employee productivity increased due to the tremendous motivation for employees to produce or lose their job. 31
Today, however, attitudes of both the government and the populace have changed. Federal and state governments are increasingly restricting employers' freedom to contract as they wish. 32 Collective bargaining is now encouraged to reduce the great disparity in the
negotiating positions of employers and employees. 33 Yet "while labor
unions have succeeded in obtaining a just cause standard for employment termination in most collective bargaining agreements, such agreements cover [only] a small and declining portion of the work force." 34
Nevertheless, because of the changes in attitude and the disparity
among the rights of workers protected by statute or collective bargaining agreements and those excluded from such job security schemes, several exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine have been judicially
adopted.

C.

Common Law Exceptions to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine

Both enactment of statutory regulations prohibiting the discharge
of employees for certain reasons 311 and protection afforded by collective
bargaining agreements have often subjected employees in the same labor pool, or perhaps of the same employer, to vast disparities in job
security. One commentator has stated:
Under the at will presumption, employees who lack union representation, do not belong to protected minority groups, or do not engage in
protected activities have no enforceable right to continued employment-regardless of the quality of their work and the continued existence of their jobs-while the employee at the next work station may
have such a right by virtue of minority group membership, and the
employee of a neighboring company will have the protection due to
union representation. . . . Furthermore, public sector employees,
whose salaries and benefits are paid from taxes extracted from the
unprotected private sector employees, may have enforceable employment rights due to federal or state civil service regulations and constitutional protections against arbitrary decision making by their governmental employers. 38
30. /d.
31. See id.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 6.
See Labor Management and Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1988).
Leonard, supra note 4, at 644 (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 6.
Leonard, supra note 4, at 647 (footnote omitted).
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Perhaps these inequalities among co-workers have been the primary motivating factor for judicially-created exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine. Exceptions to the doctrine can be placed into
three primary categories: 37 (1) the public policy exception, (2) the express or implied contract term exception, and (3) the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing exception. 38

1.

The public policy exception

Until the late 1950s, the employment-at-will presumption remained unpenetrated unless legislation explicitly prohibited employee
discharge for a specific reason. 39 The practices of some employers were
so subversive to modern principles of employment law and ideals of
fairness that one could scarcely imagine a more capricious doctrine of
law.
Not until 1959, in Petermann v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, 40 did a court look beyond the explicit language of a statute
to identify its underlying rationale or policy and apply it as an exception to the at-will doctrine. 41 In Petermann, the California Court of
Appeal held that termination of an employee for his refusal to commit
perjury before the California legislature gave rise to a claim for wrongful termination.4 2 While not expressly prohibited by statute, termination of Mr. Petermann for refusing to perjure himself so undermined
legislative policy that the court grafted a public policy exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine.4 3
Since Petermann, the public policy exception to the employmentat-will doctrine has been further expanded. The logical and fundamental reason for the public policy exception
is that the traditional formulation of the at will rule . . . would
undermine legislative attempts to enhance social welfare if too rigidly
observed, or would sanction behavior inimical to general societal interests embraced in the common law. As with the statutory exceptions,•• the public policy exception does not replace the at will presumption, but instead provides a mechanism for identifying

37. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1041 (Utah 1989).
38. /d.
39. Note, Remedies for Employer's Wrongful Discharge for an Employee from Employment
of an Indefinite Duration, 21 IND. L. REv. 54 7, 556 (1988).
40. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
41. Note, supra note 39, at 556-57.
42. Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 28.
43. /d.
44. See statutes cited supra note 6.
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discharge.'~

Just what is "public policy"-or a violation thereof-is a question
that has troubled courts in many areas of the law. The primary source
of guidance for the courts as to what constitutes public policy is legislative action and the constitutional principles that underlie statutory
schemes. 46 It is not surprising that legislative declarations are the
source most often looked to for guidance since, theoretically, legislatures
act in accordance with public attitudes and sentiment. Thus, legislative
actions should reflect the social and moral ideals of the general
populace.
Legislative enactments, however, are not the exclusive source for
determining "public policy.""' 7 Courts also look to executive orders,
rules, and regulations for enlightenment in defining the bounds of
"public policy." 48 Quite often courts examine their own prior holdings
and the holdings of other courts to see if a discharge has violated judicially-created public policy. 49 In formulating public policy out of the
common law, courts attempt to derive principles from the common law
that reflect "notions of evolving standards of conduct appropriate in
society." 50 Standards of appropriate conduct of one generation, however, may differ from the socially desirable standards embodied in the
public policy of another generation. 51
That public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine
did not surface until the late 1950s does not mean such exceptions were
not inherent in the doctrine when Wood's formulation was adopted. 52
At the turn of the century, many of the interests protected today were
socially undesirable. 53 Thus, the protection of such interests and rights
was not embodied in the "public policy" of the era, and an employee
discharge for reasons now viewed as capricious and subversive did not
violate public policy.
While what constitutes public policy may be difficult to discern,
one court declared that "public policy" is "that principle of law which
holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
(1930)).
52.
53.

Leonard, supra note 4, at 657-58 (footnote added) (citations omitted).
See id. at 659.
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1043 (Utah 1989).
Leonard, supra note 4, at 659.
Berube, 771 P.2d at 1043.
Leonard, supra note 4, at 658.
See Berube, 771 P.2d at 1043 (quoting Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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injurious to the public or against the public good." 114 However, a court
may define "public policy," it is almost universally held that a discharge in violation of discernable public policy falls within an exception
to the employment-at-will rule and, the employee can thereby pursue a
claim for wrongful termination.

2.

The express or implied contract term exception

The rule stated in Wood's 1877 treatise 1111 that "a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will" 116 remains theoretically intact today. Under most state's laws, however, the employment-at-will
presumption is rebuttable and is not a substantive rule of law. 117 Obviously, if an employment contract expressly states that it is for a specified term, no employment-at-will presumption arises. Similarly, however, even when there is an indefinite hiring, an employee may rebut
the at-will presumption by producing extrinsic evidence that the parties
intended employment to continue for a definite time or that the employee would be discharged only for just cause.
In Thompson v. American Motor Inns, 118 the Federal District
Court for the District of Virginia stated:
In absence of an express provision or specific contract setting a definite period of employment, the presumption of an employee's at will
status may be rebutted by presenting evidence which shows that the
parties intended and/or understood that the term of employment was
fixed by reference to some articuable standard or procedure. There
must be evidence of a custom, practice or policy that governs the employer-employee relationship. Evidence sufficient to establish an implied contract concerning duration of employment effectively rebuts
the presumption of at will status and binds the employer to the terms
of such a contract. 59

The California Court of Appeal similarly stated the rule. "The presumption that an employment contract is intended to be terminable at
will is subject, like any presumption, to contrary evidence. This [evidence] may take the form of an agreement, express or implied, that the
relationship will continue for some fixed period of time." 60
54. Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 188, 344 P.2d 25,
27 (1959), cited in Berube, 771 P.2d at 1042.
55. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
56. H. Wooo, supra note 14, at § 134.
57. See, e.g., Thompson v. American Motor Inns, 623 F. Supp. 409, 413-16 (W.O. Va.
1985).
58. 623 F. Supp. 409 (W.O. Va. 1985).
59. /d. at 416.
60. Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 324, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 924 (1981)
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Recently, courts have begun to abandon the historic prerequisites-mutuality of obligation and/or independant consideration-toestablish "for cause" employment. 61 Addressing the mutuality of obligation and independent consideration issues, the Thompson court stated:
[e)ven if the employee can still quit at will, the contract is not void for
lack of consideration; there is no requirement of complete mutuality
of obligation.
[A)n employee's continued service and his failure to exercise his
power to terminate his employment is sufficient consideration for an
additional promise by the employer [to not terminate except for
cause). 82

Courts are now increasingly looking to other extrinsic facts that
readily imply a durational hiring or termination "for cause" only standard. They find intent to impose such restrictions through informal
statements by (or assurances of) managers and supervisors63 through
policy directives, 64 personnel policies or practices of the employer, 611 the
length of time the employee has worked for the employer,66 practices
within the particular industry, 67 statements contained in employment
manuals, 68 or any other circumstances which might demonstrate the intent of the parties. 69
The recognition of a court's ability to look not only for mutuality
of obligation and/or independent consideration but also for any other
circumstance demonstrating the intent of the parties has bolstered litigation under the employment-at-will doctrine. 70 Now, more than half
of the states have recognized the express or implied contract term exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. 71
Despite the expansion of the express or implied contract exception,
most courts have not allowed an exception where an employment con(citing Millsap v. National Funding Corp., 57 Cal. App. 2d 772, 775, 135 P.2d 407, 409 (1943))
(emphasis added).
61. "For cause employment" refers to an employment relationship where the employee will
only be discharged when his/her performance is insufficient in some way.
62. Thompson, 623 F. Supp. at 414 (quoting Barger v. General Elec. Co., 599 F. Supp.
1154, 1161 (W.O. Va. 1984)).
63. Leonard, supra note 4, at 649.
64. Id.
65. Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 327, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925 (1981).
66. Id. (citing Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722
(1980)).
67. Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 327, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 926.
68. See, e.g., Thompson v. American Motor Inns, 623 F. Supp. 409 (W.O. Va. 1985).
69. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989).
70. See Leonard, supra note 4, at 635.
71. Id.
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tract bases compensation on a monthly or annual salary. 72 Nevertheless, in Hartman v. C. W. Travel, Inc. 73 the court held that summary
judgment for the employer was improper since the written employment
agreement contained a provision for annual employee review. 74 The
reference to an annual employee review was the only fact from which
an implied-in-fact relationship could arise. 76 If this "implied-in-fact"
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine continues to expand, it is
probable that the entire notion of employment-at-will might be wholly
abandoned.

3.

Implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception

Many courts have recognized that inherent in every contract is an
implied covenant that the parties will deal fairly and in good faith with
each other. 76 In this regard, some states have held employment contracts to be no different than other contracts in allowing the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing to be imposed by force of law. 77 Other state
courts only imply such a covenant "where the conduct or words of the
parties indicate that they contemplated such a covenant." 78 Still, other
courts have construed the implied covenant even more narrowly, applying it only where previously earned obligations are owed. 79 In Monge
v. Beebe Rubber Co., 80 however, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
expanded the implied covenant exception by adopting a balancing test.
The court formulated a breach of the covenant as follows:
In all employment contracts, whether at will or for a definite term,
the employer's interest in running his business as he sees fit must be
balanced against the interest of the employee in maintaining his employment, and the public's interest in maintaining a proper balance
between the two. We hold that a termination by the employer of a
contract of employment at will which is motivated by bad faith or
malice or based on retaliation is not [in] the best interest of the economic system or the public good and constitutes a breach of the em72. See, e.g., Hartman v. C.W. Travel, Inc., 792 F.2d 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
73. 792 F.2d 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
74. /d. at 1181.
75. See id.
76. See, e.g., Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah 1985).
77. See Rees v. Bank Bldg. and Equip. Corp. of America, 332 F.2d 548 (7th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 932 (1964); Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 722 (1980); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974); Berube v.
Fashion Centre Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1046 (Utah 1989).
78. Berube, 771 P.2d at 1046 (discussing Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg. Co., 212 Mont.
274, 687 P.2d 1015 (1984)).
79. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
80. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
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ployment contract. Such a rule affords the employee a certain stability
of employment and does not interfere with the employer's normal exercise of his right to discharge, which is necessary to permit him to
operate his business efficiently and profitably. 81

Another court expanded the theory of an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing even further. It reasoned that an employee's longevity
alone-eighteen years-provided a basis for breach of the implied
covenant. 82
The Utah Supreme Court, in Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.,83
stated that termination of an at-will employee without cause may not
be tantamount to a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. 8 " The court instead felt that whether. the implied covenant
was breached must "be determined in light of all relevant circumstances, including the contract's terms, the employer's conduct, and the
employee's reasonable expectations." 811
Courts have not applied the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing exception to the employment-at-will doctrine consistently.
A significant minority of courts have, however, recognized its existence
and applied it to do justice in wrongful termination cases. 86

III.

DEVELOPMENT oF THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DocTRINE IN

UTAH

The Utah Supreme Court first considered the employment-at-will
doctrine in Price v. Western Loan & Savings Co. 87 Price involved an
attorney who, after representing Western Loan for several years, was
hired as an employee at a salary of $100 per month. 88 In a letter dated
May 3, 1904, Mr. Price confirmed the salary and other terms of the
employment contract. 89 The letter stated that Mr. Price's services were
"to continue so long as [they] are as satisfactory as they have been the
past two years." 90 In holding that Mr. Price was terminable at the will
of Western Loan, the court stated that since Mr. Price "could terminate the contract at will" and since "[t]he only consideration that
81. Monge, 114 N.H. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551-552 (citations omitted), quoted in Leonard,
supra note 4, at 654.
82. Cleary, Ill Cal. App. 3d at 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
83. 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989).
84. /d. at 1046 (dicta).
85. /d. at 1046-47 (footnote omitted).
86. See cases cited supra notes 77-79.
87. 35 Utah 379, 100 P. 677 (1909).
88. /d. at 382, 100 P. at 678.
89. /d.
90. /d. (quoting Letter from C.S. Price to Western Loan & Savings Co. (May 3, 1904)).
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passed from [Mr. Price] . . . was his promise to perform the services,"
the contract "lacked the essential element of mutuality of obligation and
was terminable at will by either party."91
Like most states adopting the doctrine of employment-at-will,
Utah did so without any effort to define an underlying rationale for the
doctrine. In Price, the court simply referred to "a line of well-reasoned
cases" 92 and adopted the doctrine as stated in Wood's 1877 treatise. 93
In 1918, the court had the opportunity to reevaluate the rule
adopted in Price. In Hancock v. Luke, 94 the plaintiff sought recission of
a contract that, in addition to other terms, provided for employment. 95
Speaking through Justice Corfman, the majority followed Price stating,
"the contract lacked the . . . element of mutuality, and therefore was
terminable by either party at will." 98
The issue of employment-at-will was not again revisited by the
Utah Supreme Court until 1957 in Held v. American Linen Supply
Co. 97 Held involved an employee covered under the terms of a union's
collective bargaining agreement. 98 The collective bargaining agreement
was intended, inter alia, "[t]o effectuate a spirit of fair dealings between employer and employee . . . . " 99 The provision of the collective
bargaining agreement pertinent to Ms. Held's claim stated, "The Company agrees not to suspend, discipline, discharge or discriminate
against any employee for lawful union activities." 100
When Ms. Held was discharged, she brought an action claiming
that the "discharge was without just cause and therefore in violation of
the terms and conditions of the collective bargaining agreement." 101 After an arbitrator found that the discharge was not motivated by her
union activities, Ms. Held brought an action in state district court for
wrongful discharge. 102 The district court denied the employer's motion
to dismiss, holding that "even in the absence of an express provision [in
the collective bargaining agreement] an employee covered by it could
91. Id. at 387, 100 P. at 680.
92. Id. at 386, 100 P. at 680.
93. H. Wooo, supra note 14, at § 134.
94. 52 Utah 142, 173 P. 137 (1918).
95. Id. at 144. 173 P. at 137.
96. ld. at 152, 173 P. at 140.
97. 6 Utah 2d 106, 307 P.2d 210 (1957).
98. ld. at 107, 307 P.2d at 210.
99. ld. (quoting Collective Bargaining Agreement between American Linen Supply Co. and
Amalgamated Clothing Workers Local Union No. 562).
100. Id. at 108, 307 P.2d at 211 (quoting from article III of the collective bargaining agreement) (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 107, 307 P.2d at 210.
102. ld. at 108-09, 307 P.2d at 211.
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not be discharged without just cause." 103 The employer appealed to the
Utah Supreme Court.
The supreme court, apparently adopting the express or implied
contract term exception, stated that whether an employee has a cause of
action for being discharged without just cause "depends upon the terms
of the contract, either express or implied . . . . " 104 The court, however, was reluctant to imply a durational term or discharge for cause
only term into the contract, absent ambiguity in the collective bargaining agreement, because if such had been intended "it could easily have
been incorporated in the agreement . . . . " 106
In Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 106 the court continued its strong reluctance to imply durational terms of employment
absent ambiguity in a written employment contract. There, the court
refused to allow the employee to introduce parol evidence that the employment contract was for a minimum specified time period. 107 Instead,
the court unanimously held that "[t]he fact that [the employee's] option
to subscribe to stock only existed as long as she was employed suggests
that either party could terminate such employment at will." 108 In
Crane Co. v. Dahle, 109 the court restated the employment-at-will doctrine: "In the absence of a contract for a definite term, an employee
may quit whenever he desires, the same as the employer may fire
him." 110
Again in 1979, the court adhered to the traditional employmentat-will presumption in Bihlmaier v. Carson. 111 In Bihlmaier, the court
stated that since "the final oral employment contract contained no express terms concerning the duration of the plaintiff's employment," the
employment relationship was terminable at the will of either party. 112
The court justified its reasoning on the lack of a stipulated duration
103. /d. at 107, 307 P.2d at 210.
104. /d. at 109, 307 P.2d at 211. The court stated:
In the absence of something in the contract of employment to fix a definite term of
service, or other contractual provision to restrict the right of the employer to discharge,
or some statutory restriction upon this right, an employer may lawfully discharge an
employee at what time he pleases and for what cause he chooses, without thereby becoming liable to an action against him. A general contract of hiring is ordinarily
deemed a contract terminable at the will of either the employer or the employee.
/d. (quoting 35 AM. juR. Master and Servant§ 34 (1941)).
105. /d.
106. 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960).
107. /d. at 6, 354 P.2d at 562.
108. Id.
109. 576 P.2d 870 (Utah 1978).
110. /d. at 872.
111. Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979).
112. /d. at 792.
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and the lack of "good consideration in addition to the services contracted to be rendered." 118
While in early cases the Utah Supreme Court's attention was focused primarily on the prerequisites of "mutuality of obligation" and
"independant consideration," 114 in Held, Bullock, and Crane Co., the
court seemed to focus more on discerning whether an intent for durationa! employment existed. In Bihlmaier, however, the court again
raised the issue of additional consideration. 116 The "additional good
consideration" exception to the at-will doctrine became one of the
court's primary focuses in Rose v. Allied Development Co. 116
Rose involved an employee who, after becoming manager of the
shoe departments at three of the employers' stores, wished to return to
school while continuing his employment. 117 When Rose expressed his
desire to attend school to his supervisor, he was told that it would be
fine so long as he continued to work forty-five hours per week and
made sure that the sales floor was supervised at all times. 118 Rose, who
was able to make the required arrangements, 119 was nevertheless discharged due to his unavailability at peak sales times and the inflexibility of his schedule. 120 Rose sued, "alleging breach of contract, promissory estoppel, contractual wrongful discharge, tortious wrongful
discharge, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing." 121 Affirming summary judgment for the defendant employer,
the court deemed the relationship as "employment-at-will." 122
The court began its analysis by recognizing that the traditional
"absolute right [of the employer] to discharge employees has been
somewhat limited by subsequent federal and state legislation." 123 Thus,
for the first time the court implicitly adopted the "public policy exception"124 to the employment-at-will doctrine.
The court then specifically discussed its prior recognition of the
"express or implied contract term exception" to the doctrine. 125 Stating
113. !d.; see also supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
114. See Hancock v. Luke, 52 Utah 142, 152, 173 P. 137, 140 (1918); Price v. Western
Loan & Sav. Co., 35 Utah 379, 382, 100 P. 677, 678 (1909).
115. Bihlmaier, 603 P.2d at 792.
116. 719 P.2d 83, 86-87 (Utah 1986).
117. ld. at 83-84.
118. ld. at 84.
119. !d.
120. !d.
121. !d.
122. !d.
123. Id. at 85.
124. See supra notes 36-51 and accompanying text.
125. Rose, 719 P.2d at 85-86 (citing Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979)).
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that the "totality of the circumstances and the intent of both parties" 126
did not contemplate a definite term of employment, the court held that
this case did not fall into the "implied contract" exception. The court's
ruling in this regard, however, differed from prior employment-at-will
cases. 127 In prior cases, the court was demonstratively reluctant to examine factors extrinsic to the actual contract terms, unless those terms
were ambiguous. 128 In contrast, the Rose court stated, "We must look
at the alleged 'understanding,' the intent of the parties, business custom
and usage, the nature of the employment, the situation of the parties,
and the circumstances of the case to ascertain the terms of the claimed
agreement. " 129
Nevertheless, the Rose court ruled that the existence of contract
terms altering the presumption of employment-at-will status must be
established by something more than an employee's "subjective understandings or expectations." 130 Despite the court's failure to recognize
the case as falling within the "express or implied contract term exception," Rose signaled the court's desire to expand the exception. The
court undertook this expansion in Berube. 131
The Rose court also gave considerable attention to whether the
employee had given consideration to the employer "in addition to the
services already required . . . . " 132 Finding that Allied, the employer,
"did not accrue any benefit by plaintiff's attendance at school," the
court held that no additional consideration had been given to effect a
rebuttal of the employment-at-will presumption. 133
Finally, the Rose court addressed the plaintiffs contention that the
doctrine of promissory estoppel should allow him recovery. 134 The
plaintiff claimed that his detrimental reliance on his supervisor's promise that his attending school would be fine was compensable. 135 The
court held that invoking promissory estoppel would be improper since
Rose was not justified in assuming that Allied intended to alter the at126. /d. at 85.
127. See e.g., Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979); Bullock v. Deseret Dodge
Truck Center, Inc. 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960); Held v. American Linen Supply Co., 6
Utah 2d 106, 307 P.Zd 210 (1957).
128. See cases cited supra note 127.
129. Rose, 719 P.2d at 86 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)).
130. /d.
131. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) (discussed infra).
132. Rose, 719 P.2d at 86 (emphasis in original).
133. /d.
134. /d. at 87.
135. !d. The damages claimed to be suffered by the plaintiff were the cost of his tuition and
books ($1,742.81) and, of course, the loss of his job. /d. at 84.
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will relationship. 136 In sum, the court adhered to its prior holding in
Bullock where it "refused to override the at-will doctrine to imply a
term of employment in the contract to which the employer had not expressly agreed. " 137
One significant contention raised by the employee in Rose that the
court simply did not address was the alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court's failure to reach the
issue is particularly peculiar since a significant number of courts had
previously recognized the covenant in employment contracts 138 and the
Utah court had itself recognized the inherent existence of the implied
covenant in every contract. 139
Why the court did not address whether a breach of the implied
covenant had occurred is unknown. What is apparent, however, is that
the court was not yet ready to recognize or even discuss breach of the
implied covenant as an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.
Recall that in Held the court failed to address this same issue, even
when the express aim of the collective bargaining agreement was "[t]o
effectuate a spirit of fair dealings between employer and employee." 140
To summarize Utah law prior to Berube, 141 the Utah Supreme
Court had recognized the "public policy" and "express or implied contract term" exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine. More important, however, was the Court's demonstrated reluctance to imply
durational terms into employment contracts. Moreover, the court had
implicitly refused to even consider whether a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing would form an exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine.

136. /d. at 87.
137. /d. (emphasis added).
138. See Rees v. Bank Bldg. and Equip. Corp. of America, 332 F.2d 548 (7th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 932 (1964); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d
1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr.
917 (1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, Ill Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980);
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Dare v. Montana
Petroleum Mktg. Co., 212 Mont. 274, 687 P.2d 1015 (1984); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114
N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
139. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).
140. Held v. American Linen Supply Co., 6 Utah 2d 106, 107, 307 P.2d 210, 210 (1957).
141. 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989).
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BERUBE
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FASHION CENTRE, LTD.

Facts
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 142 involved an employee who, af-

ter beginning work in 1979 as a sales clerk, had been promoted to assistant manager of the employer's Fashion Gal clothing store located in
Ogden, Utah. 143 Ms. Berube's past promotions had been based on her
job performance and demonstrated ability. 144 At one point, Ms. Berube
was even told "she could expect to be a store manager someday." 1411
The employer had a written disciplinary policy providing that employees would not be terminated "without prior warning except for
specific reasons, including failure to pass or refusal to take a polygraph
examination." 146 Employees were promised "a warning and an opportunity to improve performance" in all other circumstances. 147 Ms. Berube's agreement with Fashion Centre did not contemplate a specified
term of employment. 148 However, Ms. Berube believed that she would
only be terminated for cause because of the procedures outlined in the
written disciplinary policy and other representations made to her. 149
Due to an apparent inventory shortage in the fall of 1981, Fashion
Centre conducted an investigation. 1110 Pursuant to the investigation,
Fashion Centre requested all employees at the Ogden store to submit to
a polygraph examination. 1111 After submitting to two polygraph examinations, the first of which showed signs of deception on one of fifteen
questions, Fashion Centre asked Ms. Berube to undergo a third examination.1112 Feeling nervous and apprehensive about the third examination, Ms. Berube asked that it be rescheduled for the following day. 1113
Ms. Berube's request was denied, and she was terminated for not taking the third examination on the requested day.
Ms. Berube subsequently filed suit alleging, among other things,
wrongful discharge and breach of her employment contract. 1114 At trial,
the jury found for Fashion Centre and Ms. Berube appealed based on
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

/d.
/d. at 1035.
/d.
/d. at 1036.

/d.
/d.
/d.

/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d. at 1037.
/d.
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the trial court's refusal to allow jury instructions on the exceptions to
the employment-at-will doctrine. 166

B.

The Court's Analysis

After undertaking an analysis of the surreptitious examination and
negligence claims/ 66 Justice Durham, writing for a plurality, reexamined the status of the employment-at-will doctrine in Utah. 167 After
briefly reviewing the historical background of the doctrine/ 68 Justice
Durham turned her attention to the exceptions to the rule, 169 summarily recognizing "the development of three primary categories of exceptions to the at-will rule." 160
Reviewing the "public policy" exception, Justice Durham stated
that it was "[p]erhaps the most logical." 161 Quoting Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 162 the plurality opinion stated
that "'public policy' is . . . that principle of law which holds that no
citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the
public or against the public good." 163
The plurality recognized that the source of discerning public policy includes both legislative and judicial pronouncements. 164 This expansion of the source of public policy was limited, however, by requiring that any quality deducible as "public policy, must be 'fundamental
and permanent' and not merely 'superficial and transitory' changing
from one generation to the next." 166 Justice Durham formulated the
application of the public policy exception as follows: "we will construe
public policies narrowly and will generally utilize those based on prior
legislative pronouncements or judicial decisions, applying only those
principles which are so substantial and fundamental that there can be
virtually no question as to their importance for promotion of the public
155. ld. Berube also appealed the trial court's denial of her motion to amend her complaint
to add a cause of action based on statutory prohibitions of surreptitious examinations (UTAH
ConE ANN.§ 34-37-16 (1988)) and the granting of summary judgment to another named defendant. Berube, 771 P.2d at 1037.
156. ld. at 1037-39.
157. ld. at 1040.
158. ld. at 1040-41.
159. For a more complete discussion of the history and development of the doctrine, see
supra notes 9-79 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra note 1; Leonard, supra note 4.
160. Berube, 771 P.2d at 1041.
161. ld. at 1042.
162. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
163. Berube, 771 P.2d at 1042 (citations omitted).
164. ld. at 1042-43.
165. ld. at 1043.
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good."lee
Holding that all principles of "public policy" should apply to durational hiring as well as indefinite hiring/ 67 the court unanimously
agreed that the public policy exception had no application in the present case and should not be applied broadly to make it routinely a violation of public policy to discharge an employee in breach of an employment-for-cause agreement. 168
Turning to the implied or express contract exception, Justice Durham's opinion characterized the at-will presumption as "merely a rule
of contract construction and not a legal principle." 169 Stating that "rigid
adherence to the at-will rule is no longer justified or advisable," the
plurality held that the traditional presumption could be rebutted by evidence found in "employment manuals, oral agreements, and all circumstances of the relationship which demonstrate the intent to terminate only for cause or to continue employment for a specified
period." 170 Such factors include "conduct of the parties, announced personnel policies, practices of that particular trade or industry, or other
circumstances which show the existence of such a promise." 171
On this point, however, Justice Durham carried but one other
vote. Justices Howe and Hall, concurring, found it unnecessary and
inappropriate to look beyond the written policy manual of the employer
since they believed that a reasonable jury could find that Ms. Berube's
termination violated Fashion Centre's written policy manual. 172 Similarly, Justice Zimmerman's concurring opinion stated "representations
made by the employer in employee manuals, bulletins, and the like are
legitimate sources for determining the apparent intentions of the parties. Because we need go no further than this to decide the present case,
I see no need to fix the precise parameters of the implied-in-fact exception."173 Justice Zimmerman then stated that if the case presented such
an issue, he would not give an expansive application of the exception
and would not allow every fact to be offered in rebuttal since such an
application would afford little predictability to employers. 174
166. /d. (footnote omitted).
167. /d. at 1043 n.10.
168. /d. at 1043, 1051. See Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., 777 P.2d 483
(Utah 1989).
169. /d. at 1044 (citing Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 628 (Minn.
1983)).
170. Berube, 771 P.2d at 1044 (emphasis added).
171. /d. (citing Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal.
Rptr. 613 (1984); Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311,171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981)).
172. /d. at 1050 (Howe, J. concurring).
173. /d. at 1052 (Zimmerman, J. concurring).
174. /d.

268

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 5

Thus, it appears that presently two justices, Durham and Stewart,
would allow all facts and circumstances to be considered in determining if an implied-in-fact "for-cause" employment relationship has been
established. Justice Zimmerman would allow only manuals, bulletins,
and other legitimate writing to be offered to rebut the presumption.
Justice Howe and Hall have not spoken on the issue but rather have
reserved that question for a more appropriate case.
A three member majority of the court expressly disavowed the requirement of "mutuality of obligation" before a "termination "for
cause" only relationship could arise. 1711 Justice Durham stated that the
fundamental assumption of mutuality of obligation-that "because an
employee may terminate . . . at any time, the employer should likewise
be free to do so" -is unfounded and illusory in a modern economy. 176
Presumably, the principle would be illusory because the employee's
motivation to quit is much less than the employer's motivation to fire
since the burden the employer faces in replacing an employee is light
compared to the tremendous reliance employees place on maintaining
their jobs.
Justice Durham also discounted the traditional requirement of independent consideration. Instead of making independent consideration a
"prerequisite" to finding "for cause" employment, Justice Durham
considered it just another factor among the totality of circumstances to
be considered in finding an implied contract of "for cause" employment.177 Justice Zimmerman agreed that logically there is no reason to
require mutuality of obligation or separate consideration as prerequisites to an employment for cause relationship. 178 Justices Howe and
Hall did not address the issue.
The plurality, per Justice Durham, applied this expanded formulation of the implied contract exception broadly, finding that, in addition to some express terms/ 79 implied terms from favorable performance reviews, comments that she had a promising future and would
advance in the company, and the fact that Ms. Berube had advanced
rapidly, created both a justified expectation and implied contract that
175. See Berube, 771 P.2d at 1045, 1051 (The majority consists of Justices Durham, Stewart, and Zimmerman).
176. /d. at 1045.
177. /d.
178. /d. at 1051 (Zimmerman, J. concurring).
179. The express terms were contained in the disciplinary action policy distributed to employees of Fashion Centre that an employee would be terminated without prior warning only for
certain reasons (i.e., refusal to take or failure to pass a polygraph), but that in all other circumstances, employees would be given a proper warning and an opportunity to improve performance.
/d. at 1047.
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Ms. Berube would be terminated only for cause. 180
It is somewhat unclear, however, whether the implied contract exceptions to the at-will presumption will be applied so expansively. Justice Zimmerman would not do so. Justices Howe and Hall seem reluctant to do so and in the midst of Justice Durham's broad formulation of
the exception, she states "(a)n implied-in-fact promise cannot, of course,
contradict a written contract term." 181 Thus, it would seem that if an
employer distributes a manual or bulletin expressly stating that the relationship was to be that of employment-at-will, an employee could not
even introduce extrinsic evidence of comments or assurances to form an
implied contract of "for cause" employment. In Berube, the employer's
disciplinary policy listed the circumstances specifying when an employee would be terminated without warning. Therefore, the issue remains open as to whether the distinguishable case of an employment
manual or memorandum simply stating that the relationship is "atwill" without enunciating specific reasons for termination will allow
the employee to introduce extrinsic evidence to prove an implied contract of "for cause" employment. How the court will rule on this issue
remains to be seen. The author, however, believes the "implied contract" exception will continually broaden until it eventually swallows
the "at-will" presumption.
Finally, the Berube court addressed whether it would recognize a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as an
exception to the employment-at-will rule. Justice Durham opened by
stating that Utah has implied such a covenant into every contract, and
that implication, in her belief, included employment contracts. 182 Recognizing that there is no clear majority application of the exception,
Justice Durham asserted that the correct application is to examine "the
employer's conduct viewed in the context of the relevant contractual
terms, express or implied, and the employee's reasonable expectations."183 Justice Durham then stated that the exception should "be
used sparingly and with caution" 184 and that damages should be determined by contract law, which limits damages to only reasonable foreseeable consequential damages. 1811
Applying her formulation of the exception, Justice Durham be180. /d.
181. /d.
622 (1984)).
182. /d.
183. /d.
3d 241, 253,
184. /d.
185. /d.

at 1048.
at 1044 (citing Shapiro v. Wells, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467,482,199 Cal. Rptr. 613,
at 1046 (citing Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah 1985)).
at 1046 (citing Rulon-Miller v. International Business Mach. Corp., 162 Cal. App.
208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 533 (1984 )).
at 1047.
at 1046.
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lieved that Ms. Berube had stated a claim for relief under the exception.188 The basis for this finding was her feeling that Fashion Centre
had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in requiring Ms. Berube to submit to three polygraph examinations over the course of several months
based on one inventory shortage and that this was done despite Ms.
Berube's willingness to submit to the third test if it were rescheduled. 187
The case was remanded for final determination by a jury on this issue.
While Justices Howe and Hall did not address the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception, Justice Zimmerman
sharply disagreed with its application. 188 Justice Zimmerman, while
appearing hostile to recognizing the exception due to the unpredictability employers would face, did not wholly reject the exception's application if it were required to do justice in a particular case. 189 Thus, while
not completely rejecting the notion, a three member majority declined to
recognize a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in employment contracts. 190
V.

DoCTRINE OF EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL IN UTAH SINCE

Berube

A series of cases decided since Berube gives some indication as to
how the three exceptions to the employment-at-will rule will be applied. The "public policy" exception has not been seriously considered
since Berube. In Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., 191 however, Justice Zimmerman, in a four-to-one decision/ 92 stated that the
court had not adopted the "public policy" exception broadly and that
the exception would not "routinely make it a violation of public policy
to discharge an employee in breach of an employment agreement [of
"for cause" termination only]. " 193 As for the "implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing" exception, three separate decisions-two of the
Utah Supreme Court and one from the Federal District Court for the
District of Utah-have expressly held that this exception has not yet
been recognized in Utah. 194
The "express or implied-in-fact contract" exception, however, has
186. /d. at 1047.
187. /d. at 1049.
188. /d. at 1051 (Zimmerman, J. concurring).
189. Id. at 1052 (Zimmerman, J., concurring).
190. See Howcroft v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., 712 F. Supp. 1514, 1522 (D. Utah
1989); Loose v. Nature-All Corp., 785 P.2d 1096, 1097 (Utah 1989); Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon &
Davis Utah, Inc., 777 P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 1989).
191. 777 P.2d 483 (Utah 1989).
192. Justice Stewart dissented.
193. /d. at 485 (citing Berube, 771 P.2d at 1050-51).
194. Howcroft, 712 F. Supp. at 1522; Loose, 785 P.2d at 1097 (Durham,].); Caldwell, 777
P.2d at 485.
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been applied broadly and has in practical effect probably emasculated
the employment-at-will presumption. In Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area
Community Action Program/ 96 subsequent to an admittedly at-will
hiring, the employer issued a manual that set forth termination procedures.196 When those procedures were not correctly followed, the employee sued and ultimately prevailed on the employer's motion for summary judgment since, under Berube, an employee can rebut the at-will
presumption with evidence contained in employment manuals. 197 In
Caldwell, the court affirmed the employer's motion for summary judgment.198 It did so, however, on the basis that in terminating the employee, the employer complied with all requirements that would have
been implied by the terms of a bulletin issued after an employment-atwill hiring. 199
This broad application of the implied-in-fact contract exception
has turned the at-will doctrine on its head, except for the analytical
framework that the doctrine provides. Utah employers must now be
sure that neither formal nor informal policies or practices create reasonable expectations in employees that they will be terminated for
cause only. To be sure, employers must avoid giving assurances, such
as "keep up the good work and you will be with this company for a
long time" and "don't worry, when it comes to your job, you have
nothing to worry about." Conceivably, such assurances, even if informally made, could give rise to a rebuttal of the at-will presumption.
Other popular employer practices might also give rise to impliedin-fact contracts of termination "for cause" only. Initial probationary
periods, manuals listing certain grounds for termination, prior warnings (formal or informal), annual employee reviews, and progressive
disciplinary steps all offer ammunition to employees wishing to rebut
the at-will presumption.
Some options which an employer might use to avoid being a "for
cause" employer would be to issue periodical memorandums renouncing any previous assurances or promises from supervisors and stating
that the employment relationship remains "at-will" absent a written
contract signed by the employer stating otherwise. Employers may also
use express written contracts precluding inconsistent implied terms.
Employment manuals might contain disclaimers of "for cause" employ195. 775 P.2d 940 (Utah App. 1989).
196. Id. at 941.
197. /d. at 942.
198. 777 P.2d 483 (Utah 1989).
199. /d. at 486; see also Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 779 P.2d 668 (Utah 1989) (holding
that the employee was entitled to a jury trial since termination procedures set forth in an employment manual could rebut the at-will presumption).
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ment language so long as they are unqualified, prominently displayed,
and expressly state that the manual is a complete integration of all
terms of employment. The well-advised employer would also maintain
thorough records of employee misconduct or poor performance in the
event that he or she may need to formulate a cause for termination.
The timing for communicating terms of employment is also of
great importance. As previously stated, an employer must take careful
steps to renounce any indications of "for cause" employment given after
an at-will relationship has been established. Likewise, the prudent employer should take careful steps early in employment contract negotiations to affirm that it is an "at-will" employer. Such steps might include displaying prominently and conspicuously on the employment
application a disclaimer of "for cause" employment and stating that no
subsequent representations by supervisors, personnel directors, or
others, and no industry practices or any prior course of dealing will
alter the status of the relationship. 200
VI.

CoNCLUSION

Since the late 1950s, state courts have begun recogmzmg exceptions to the long-standing presumption that indefinite hirings are "atwill." Some courts, including the Utah Supreme Court, have begun to
construe one or several of the recognized exceptions so broadly and apply the exceptions so liberally that the traditional employment-at-will
presumption has been emasculated and now serves merely to provide a
theoretical framework for analysis. Because of the broadly applied exceptions, employers wishing to maintain their "employment-at-will"
status must now take affirmative steps to rebut facts that would implicate "termination for cause only" employment.

justin R. Olsen

200. The author does not advocate that these steps would always make the most business
sense. Such a determination must be left to the individual employers. The precautions suggested
here are offered only as combative measures to rebuttal of the at-will presumption.

